Chapter!1.!! Introduction!
Section'1.1'' The'government'in'an'economy'
Politicians,' philosophers' and' economists' have' been' arguing' about' the' role' of' the' government' in' a' country's' economy' for' centuries.' The' government' is' an' important' economic'agent,'and'it'is'the'only'agent'whose'actions'can'be'controlled'to'some'extent;'it' would' be' impossible' to' 'control'' all' consumers' or' firms' in' an' economy.' The' government' spending'is'decided'upon'by'a'relatively'small'group'of'people,'but'the'economic'impact'of' that' spending' is' quite' large ' (Galí' et' al.,' 2007; ' Cogan' et' al.,' 2010) .' Therefore,' the' way' the' government'should'spend'money'is'a'widely'researched'topic.'Most'high'school'economics' students' know' Keynes'' antifcyclical' budget' policy' (Keynes,' 1933) ,' and' the' field' of' policy' economics' has' established' itself' as' an' important' field' within' the' economic' science.' This' is' understandable;' if' there' is' a' governmental' policy' that' can' achieve' a' certain' goal' that' we'
have'in'mind'for'our'economy,'then'it'might'be'a'good'idea'to'implement'that'policy. 'But' what'if'we'would'take'one'step'back?'What'if'we'could'change'the'way'an'economy'works,'
simply'by'changing'the'way'we'elect'our'politicians?' ' Section'1.2'' Electoral'systems'
Most' democratic' countries' have' a' government' consisting' of' chosen ' politicians,' and' some' form'of'either'a'unicameral'or'bicameral'parliament.'The'way'in'which'politicians'are'chosen' into' a' parliament' differs' vastly' among' countries. ' However,' a' consensus' exists' between' political' economists,' that' there' are' three' important' electoral' systems.' Firstly,' political' economists' distinguish' a' proportional' representation' system' (often' abbreviated' as' PR),' in' which,'in'its'purest'form,'a'certain'percentage'of'votes'yields'the'same'percentage'of'seats' in'the'representative'house' (Aboal,'2009; 'Shepsle,'2010) .'' Secondly,'they'distinguish'a'majoritarian'system,'in'which'a'country'is'often'divided'into'a' large' number' of' districts.' A' district' chooses' one' or' a' few' representatives,' which' leads' to' overrepresentation'of'the'party'with'the'most'votes' (Aboal,'2009) . 'For'example,'if'a'party' receives'50%'of'the'votes'in'50%'of'the'districts,'that'party'holds'50%'of'the'parliamentary' seats,'while'it'has'only'received'25%'of'the'total'votes.'A'majoritarian'electoral'system'often' ! 4! leads'to'two'large'parties,'while'a'PR'system'leads'to'multiple'smaller'parties.'This'concept'is' also'known'as'Duverger's'Law' (Shepsle,'2010) .''' ' Some' countries' have' chosen' a' mixture' of' these' two' systems.' Representatives' are' first' chosen'in'a'majoritarian'system. 'Then,'extra'representatives'are'added'in'a'proportionate,' listfwise'election' (Karp'&'Banducci,'2008) .'Some'countries'use'this'proportionate'part'of'the' election'to'correct'for'any'disproportionality'in'the'election'outcome.'Other'countries'have' not'designed'this'PR'part'to'make'the'election'more'proportionate.'These'forms'of'mixed' systems,'along'with'the'PR'and'majoritarian'system,'will'be'elaborated'upon'in'Chapter'2.'' ' Section'1.3'' Choosing'a'system' Obviously,' there' is' no' consensus' about' which' political' system' is' 'better'.' When' choosing'
between' electoral' systems,' countries' face' several ' tradefoffs,' and' an' important' one' is' that' between' 'representation'' and' 'governance'.' Pure' PR' systems' make' sure' that' a' parliament'
represents' all' political' movements' within' a' country,' and' more' specifically,' also' represents' minorities.'On'the'other'hand,'in'countries'with'PR'systems,'there'is'hardly'any'party'that'
holds'a'majority,'which'means'that'coalitions'have'to'be'formed.'That'means'that'they'have'
to 'negotiate,'and'get'along'with'each'other.'In'majoritarian'systems,'one'party'often'holds'a' majority,'which'means'that'it'can'start'governing'right'away,'and'that'it'does'not'have'to' take' other' parties' into' account' (Shepsle,' 2010) . ' ' Parties' that' form' a' coalition' tend' to' disagree'more'than'onefparty'governments.'Because'of'this,'coalition'governments'tend'to' fall' earlier.' This' is' also' seen' in' the' average' government' length; ' the' average' length' of' government'in'Canada,'which'uses'a'majoritarian'system,'is'3'years,'10'months'and'14'days' (Parliament'of'Canada,'2014) ;'in'Belgium'the'average'length'is'1'year,'7'months'and'7'days,'
and'in'The'Netherlands,'it'is'2'years,'4'months'and'27'days 1 .'These'countries'both'use'a'PR' system.'' ' These'arguments'are'of'a'political'and'ethical'nature.'As'mentioned'earlier,'this'thesis'will' investigate' whether' there' is' actually' an' economic' argument' for' either' system.' Economists'
have' philosophized' about' the' way' an' electoral' system' changes' policy' outcomes,' but' they' have'not'performed'an'experimental'research.'For'example, 'Aboal'(2009)'has'developed'a' model'with'three'classes; 'rich,'middle'and'poor,'and'he'compares'the'outcome'of'economic' policy'between'a'PR'and'majoritarian'system.'He'finds'that'a'PR'system'leads'to'10%'more' economic' growth' over' one ' generation, ' or' alternatively' 0, 14' percentage' point' GDP' growth' extra' per' year. ' develop' a' model' with' three' types' of' governmental'benefits:'those'that'benefit'many'citizens,'those'that'benefit'few'citizens,'and' those' that' benefit' politicians.' They' argue' that' in' majoritarian' systems,' parties' know' that' they' will' win' for' sure' in' some' districts,' and' therefore' they' focus' their' campaign' on' other' districts.' Therefore,' the' policies' that' they' propose' are' targeted' at' those' pivotal' districts,' thus'benefiting'especially'those'citizens.'They'argue'that'countries'with'PR'systems'lead'to' policies'that'target'a'large 'group'of'citizens.'This'leads'to'smaller'government'spending'and' lower' taxes' in' majoritarian' systems' (MilesifFerreti' et' al.,' 2002) .' Also,' rent' seeking' is' minimized'as'district'size'grows' (Myerson,'1993) .''' ' Section'1.4' The'existing'literature'and'research'question' So,' looking' at' the' existing' literature,' some' theoretical' research' and' arguments' exist,'
claiming'that'there'might'be'a'difference'in'impact'on'economic'growth'between'electoral' systems. ' Persson,' Roland' and' Tabellini' (2003) ' have' constructed' a' model' concerning' the' relationship' between' electoral' systems' and' government' spending,' but' this' is' only' part' of' economic'performance.'It'would'be'interesting'to'see'whether'there'is'actually'an'economic' argument'for'one'of'the'three'systems'(PR,'majoritarian'or'mixed)'for'countries'to'choose' one' of' these. ' It' might' look' irrelevant' to' debate' about' choosing' electoral' systems;' most' countries'have'already'designed'their'electoral'system,'and'for'them'it'might'feel'like'they' are'set'in'stone. 'However,'in'1993'New'Zealand'held'a'referendum'among'citizens'in'which' they' could,' more' or' less,' choose' between' changing' into' a' PR' system,' of' retaining' the' existing' majoritarian' system.' The' majority' of' citizens' chose' to' change' the' system' in' to' PR' (Vowels,' 2005) .' Not' only' the' opportunity' to' vote' in' a' referendum' about' which' electoral' system' is' used' in' a' country' is' noteworthy,' New' Zealand's' economic' growth' was' also' significantly'larger'after'1993'than'before.'
performance,'the'research'question'that'this'thesis'seeks'to'answer'is:! ' How!does!economic!growth!differ!among!electoral!systems?! ' It'could'be'very'difficult'to'examine'such'a'difference;'GDP'data'is'often 'measured'in'local' currency,' and' is' very' difficult' to' compare' between' countries.' GDP' growth' data' is' more' comparable'between'countries,'but'still'there'is'much'variation'each'year'in'growth'data.'It'
would'be'better'to'estimate'some'sort'of'average'growth'number'for'each'country,'so'that' only'longfterm'effects'are'captured,'and'thereby'political'effects'become'more'visible.'' ' Section'1.5'' Natural'growth'and'data''
Economists'sometimes'use'the'term''natural''growth,'which'is'often'described'as'the'growth'
that' an' economy' on' average,' intrinsically' experiences;' it' is' the' growth' that' it' can' achieve'
with' its' existing' production' factors,' leaving' out' growth' shocks' and' cyclical' effects' ' (Lippi,' 1999 ; 'Barro,'1991) .'It'would'seem'logical'to'assume'that'it'is'this'growth'that'does'capture' longfterm,'integrated'effects'such'as'a'political'system.'Therefore,'it'would'be'plausible'to' use'this'variable,'natural'economic'growth,'to'study'any'difference'among'political'systems.'' ' Lippi'(1999)'tried'to'establish'a'model'to'study'the'effect'of'monetary'policy'on'a'country's' economic'growth. 'He'regarded'nominal'economic'growth'in'a'year'as'the'result'of'monetary' policy,'which'could'either'result'in'inflation'or'real'economic'growth.'Of'course,'monetary' policy' is' targeted' at' real' economic' growth.' So, ' Lippi' sought' to' measure' how' effective' monetary'policy'was'in'affecting'real'economic'growth.'However,'in'establishing'his'model,' he' studied' the' Philips' curve,' and' described' a' way' to' calculate' natural' economic' growth,' using'nominal'and'real'GDP'growth'data.'This'model'will'be'described'in'Chapter'2.'' ' Clearly,' not' all' existing' countries' have' a' democratic,' political' system' that' can' be' placed' in' one' of' the' three' categories' mentioned' earlier. ' Countries' that' have' a' dictatorial' form' of' government,'in'which'elections'are'not'held'or'in'which'elections'are'manipulated,'are'not' relevant'for'this'research.'This'research'tries'to'find'an'economic'argument'for'democratic' ! 7! countries'in'choosing'between'these'electoral'systems.'Therefore,'this'research'will'focus'on' the'countries'that'are'a'member'of'the'OECD,'the'Organisation'for'Economic'Cooperation'
and' Development.' This' provides' a' number' of' advantages;' the' OECD' measures' economic' growth,'both'nominal'and'real,'for'all'its'member'countries,'so'that'the'data'on'economic' growth'is'all'derived'from'the'same'source.'Also,'all'member'countries'have'been'included'
in'lots'of'research.'Both' (Karp'&'Banducci,'2008; 'Lijphart,'1999) 'have'tried'to''label''(most' of)'these'countries'as'PR,'majoritarian'or'mixed.'So,'using'these'labels,'the'natural'growth' data'of'OECD'countries'can'be'grouped'into'one'of'these'systems.'Some'countries'are'not'
arise,' they' have' been' taken' care' of.' Further' methods' used' to' evaluate' the' results' are' discussed'there'as'well.'After'the'model'has'been'estimated'for'all'countries,'it'is'used'to' calculate'natural'growth'rates'for'each'of'them.'The'countries'are'then'grouped'into'either'
countries'have'not'been'researched'by'either'of'them,'so'they'are'given'a'label'according'to' the'criteria'described'in'Chapter'2.' ' Section'1.6'' The'analysis'
The' natural' growth' data' was' grouped' into' one' of' three' possible' groups:' PR,' majoritarian' and'mixed.'After'checking'the'assumptions'of'ANOVA'analysis'for'the'data,'the'ANOVA'test'
will'be'performed,'to'analyse'whether'natural'growth'differs'significantly'among'groups.'The' ANOVA' analysis' will' reveal' that' this' is' not' the' case;' the' natural' growth' does' not' differ'
significantly' among' groups;' in' fact' natural' growth' rates' lie' very' close' to' each' other' in' the' three'different'groups.'This'thesis'will'therefore'not'be'able'to'establish'a'significant'effect' of'the'electoral'system'on'the'natural'growth'of'a'country.'
In'Chapter'2,'the'existing'electoral'systems'in'the'world'were'grouped'into'three'countries:'
Proportional' Representation,' Majoritarian' and' Mixed.' As' these' three' groups' will' be' used'
later'on'in'Chapter'3'and'4'to'compare'natural'growth'data,'they'will'be'elaborated'upon'
and'made'more'precise.'
researched' both' this' system' and' the' Majoritarian' system.' As' the' term' PR' already' implies,'
this' system' focuses' on' proportionate' representation' of' cultural' and' political' groups' in' the'
representative'house.'This'is'to'make'sure'that'minorities'are'also'represented,'and'to'make' sure' that' a' majority' in' the' house' is' not' easily' obtained' by' one' party' (Lijphart,' 1999) . and' the' government' fall' apart.' Parties' therefore' have' to' cooperate' and' negotiate' before' taking'any'steps.'Another'element'of'the'consensus'model'is'that'it'has'strong'bicameralism.'
One' house,' often' the' House' of' Representatives,' is' the' house' in' which' the' citizens' are'
represented'proportionally,'while'in'the'other'house,'often'called'the'Senate,'the'different' groups' (language' groups,' ethnicities,' religious' groups)' are' represented' equally.' Think' for' example' of' the' European' Union;' the' European' Parliament' represents' each' country'
proportionally,' while' the' European' Council' has' one' representative' for' each' European' country.' Because' of' the' importance' of' minority' groups' and' local' interests,' the' Consensus' model'often'sees'a'strong'division'between'centralized'and'decentralized'government.'' ' Almost' contrary' to' the' Consensus' model,' most' AnglofSaxon' countries' use' a' Majoritarian' system,'sometimes'called'the'Westminster'model' (Lijphart,'1999) .'The'main'characteristic'of' ! 9! this' system' is' that' representatives' are' chosen' in' a' disproportional' way.' The' country' is' divided' into' districts' or' constituencies,' and' each' constituency' elects' one' or' more'
representatives' (Wilson,' 1994) .' The' more' constituencies' there' are,' and' the' fewer'
representatives' each' constituency' elects,' the' more' disproportionate' the' election' results' become.'If'a'party'is'rather'popular'in'at'least'half'of'the'constituencies,'it'can'easily'obtain' a'majority'of'the'representatives.'The'Westminster'model'often'leads'to'two'large'parties' who'compete'for'the'majority,'and'with'a'threat'of'a'third'party'entering,'they'will'locate'at'
either' side' of' the' median' voter;' this' is' also' called' the' Downsian' model' (Downs,' 1957) .'
Because'either'one'of'the'parties'holds'the'majority,'the'government'also'exist'of'only'that' party,' and' there' is' little' need' for' a' separation' of' the' legislative' and' executive' power.' Therefore,' in' the' Westminster' model,' the' members' of' the' government' are' often' also' members'of'the'parliament,'unlike'in'the'Consensus'model.'The'Westminster'model'often'
has' a' unicameral' system' or' a' bicameral' system' with' a' 'weak'' senatorial' house,' with' little'
Lijphart' himself' also' acknowledges' that' there' is' hardly' any' country' that' has' an' electoral' system'that'perfectly'fits'the'characteristics'of'these'two'models.'However,'most'countries'
can' be' labelled' as' either' one' of' these,' and' Lijphart' has' done' this' for' thirtyfsix' countries,' twentyfeight' of' which' are' OECD' countries.' Some' countries' have' a' rather' difficult' system' which'carries'elements'from'both'systems.'It'might'therefore'be'a'good'thing'to'take'these' countries'apart'and'regard'their'system'as'a'mixed'system.'' ' Karp' and' Banducci' (2008) ' mention' that' countries' like' Germany' may' not' fit' either' model' described'above;'in'the'German'system,'half'of'the'members'are'chosen'in'a'majoritarian' way,'but'the'voters'also'get'a''national''list'vote'(a''Zweitstimme').'The'chosen'constituency'
representatives' are' then' complemented' with' additional' representatives' to' fit' the' distribution' of' national' votes.' This' system' can' therefore' be' regarded' as' a' majoritarian' system'with'corrective'features.'Karp'and'Banducci'also'distinguish'systems'in'which'some' members' are' chosen' as' constituency' representatives,' while' others' in' the' same' house' are'
chosen' in' a' PR' system;' these' systems' however' do' not' use' the' PR' part' as' corrective.' The' countries'that'use'a'mixture'of'both'majoritarian'systems'and'PR'systems,'either'corrective' or' nonfcorrective,' are' regarded' as' having' a' 'Mixed'' system' in' this' thesis.' If' they' would' be' ! 10! grouped' in' either' corrective' mixed' or' nonfcorrective' mixed,' there' would' be' groups' with' only'two'or'three'countries,'which'would'give'statistical'difficulties.'This'will'be'elaborated' upon' in' Chapter' 3,' however.' For' now,' countries' that' use' both' systems' are' regarded' as' mixed'countries.'' Section'2.2'' Estimating'natural'growth'
The' purpose' of' distinguishing' different' electoral' systems' is' to' investigate' whether' some' countries'actually'perform'better'economically'than'others.'It'is'difficult'however,'to'have'a' good'measure'for'economic'performance.'GDP'or'GDP'growth'is'often'taken'as'a'measure'
of'economic'performance,'but'this'is'mostly'yearly'data.'It'is'better'to'take'a'look'at'a'longf term' economic' indicator' to' see' whether' that' actually' differs' among' systems.' Taking' the' average'GDP'growth'of'each'country'for'a'period'of'say,'30'years,'would'take'into'account'
shortfterm,' cyclical,' demandfrelated' effects' too.' However,' as' this' thesis' tries' to' explore' a'
relationship'between'electoral'systems'and'economic'growth,'it'is'better'to'use'longfterm,' supplyfrelated'GDP'growth. 'Lippi'(1999) 'has,'be'it'for'other'purposes,'established'a'model' that'describes'the'relationship'between'real'output'growth'on'the'one'hand,'and'nominal' output'growth'and'inflation'on'the'other'hand.'' '
In'this'model'the'real'output'is'described'by''
(1)' ! ! 'is' the' logarithm' of' the' real' output,' and' time' is' defined' as' the' current' year' of' the' observation,'so'if't=1998,'then'time'is'equal'to'1998.'!! ! 'is'the'change'in'the'logarithm'of' nominal'output,'so'basically'the'nominal'GDP'growth.'τ'measures'how'much'of'nominal'GDP' growth'results'in'real'GDP'growth,'and'as'
complete'nominal'output'growth'ends'up'in'the'real'output'growth'(with'zero'inflation),'and'
with'! = 0'all' nominal' output' growth' ends' up' as' inflation,' leaving' a' real' output' growth' of' zero.' Lippi' stresses' that' several' authors' have' added' different' economic' interpretations' to' equation'1; 'Lucas'(1973) 'has'provided'a'rationfexpectations'interpretation, 'Ball,'Mankiw'and' Romer' (1988 )' use' a' New' Keynesian' interpretation' and' Schultze' (1984 ' uses' a' Keynesian' interpretation.'' ! 11! Looking'at'natural'growth,'we'are'interested'in'the'long'run.'As'!! ! 'is'a'shortfterm'variable,' the'longfrun'relationship'is:'
As'mentioned,'time'is'the'year'of'the'current'observation.'So'if't=1998,'then'time'is'1998,'
and'when'looking'at'! !!! 'in'equation'4,'time'would'then'be'1997.'Therefore'it'is'notated'as' However,' they' point' to' research' that' suggests' that' unit' elasticity' of' aggregate' demand' is' realistic'(Mankiw'&'Summers,'1986).'They'also'explain'that'monetary'policy,'implemented' in' response' to' supply' shocks,' may' reduce' or' even' eliminate' its' effect' on' nominal' GDP.' Furthermore,' in' an' effort' to' reduce' bias' in' τ, ' Ball,' Mankiw' and' Romer' use' a' dummy' representing' oil' prices,' which' is' +1' in' years' of' major' oil' price' increases' and' f1' in' years' of' major' decreases.' This' had' little' effects' on' the' results.' Because' modelling' supply' shocks' is' ! 12! rather'difficult,'and'because'its'effect'on'the'estimations'of'the'model'is'little,'this'variable'is'
Seeing'the'model'described'above,'and'more'specifically'equation'1'and'6,'it'will'be'used'in' the'next'Chapter'to'estimate'natural'growth'data'for'all'OECD'countries.'The'countries'will' then'be'grouped'into'either'PR,'majoritarian'or'mixed'according'to'the'studies'cited'above.'
The'results'of'this'analysis'will'be'discussed'in'Chapter'4.'' ' ' Six' countries' produced' results' where' either' no' or' only' one' variable' was' significant.'
Countries'with'difficulties'were'France,'Hungary,'Italy,'Japan,'Korea'and'the'Slovak'Republic.'
The' models' for' these' countries' produced' very' insignificant' variables;' because' two' of' the' variables'are'used'to'calculate'natural'growth'data,'it'is'important'that'they'are'estimated'
When'looking'at 'France,'inflation'was'rather'high'between'1970 'France,'inflation'was'rather'high'between' 'and'1987 'varying'between' 6%'and'13%.'After'1987'inflation'returned'to'lower'values'between'0,5%'and'3%'(see'Graph' 2'in'the'appendix).'Performing'a'Chowfbreakpoint'test'revealed'a'significant 'break'in'1987 .' When'a'Chowfbreakpoint'test'(Chow,'1960 higher'than'10%'(see'Graph'6'in'the'Appendix). 'From'1983 'From' 'onward,'inflation'varied'between' 0%'and'10%.'A'significant'break'exists'in'1983 'so'the'model'was'estimated'for'1983f2013'as' well.''
The' Slovak' Republic' is' the' only' country' where' there' is' no' apparent' break' in' the' data;' inflation'was'really'high'upon'its'formation'as 'a'country'in'1992.'It'has'decreased'to'lower' values,'but'it'is'still'very'volatile'(see'Graph'5'in'the'Appendix) .'The'model'for'Slovakia'was' therefore'not'adapted,'making'its'estimation'of'natural'growth'less'reliable.''' ' After'the'model'was'estimated'for'all'countries,'with'adaptions'made'as'described'above,' the'natural'growth'was'calculated'for'each'country,'following'equation'6.'The'outcome'of' these'calculations'has'been'reported'in'the'Appendix'in'table'3.'The'highest'value'was'7,8%'
for' Italy,' and' the' lowest' was' 0,4%' for' the' Slovak' Republic,' though' it' should' be' noted' that' this'estimation'may'not'be'accurate.'' ' Section'3.4' The'labelling'of'countries'
The'countries'were'grouped'into'either'PR,'majoritarian'or'mixed'following'Lijphart'(1999)'
and' Karp' &' Banducci' (2008) .' Lijphart' labels' 23' of' the' OECD' countries,' leaving' 11' of' them' unlabelled.'Karp'and'Banducci'also'label'23'OECD'countries,'six'of'which'are'not'included'in'
Lijphart's' research.' Moreover,' they' label' Germany' as' a' mixed' system,' while' Lijphart' calls' Germany's' system' PR.' Because' the' German' system' possesses' qualities' of' both' a' PR' and' majoritarian'system,'as'discussed'in'Chapter'2,'and'because'Karp'and'Banducci's'research'is' more' recent,' Germany's' systems' will' be' regarded' as' mixed' in' this' thesis.' Furthermore,' as' mentioned' in' Chapter' 2,' there' are' two' types' of' mixed' systems' distinguished' by' Lijphart.'
There' are' mixed' systems' that' use' the' PR' part' to' correct' the' disproportionality' of' the' majoritarian' election,' but' there' are' also' countries' that' do' not' use' the' PR' part' to' correct' disproportionality.' Germany' and' Mexico' have' designed' their' system' to' correct' disproportionality,'while'the'Hungarian,'Japanese'and'Korean'system'is'purely'mixed.'These' 5' countries' are' considered' one' group,' however,' because' otherwise' there' would' be' two' Estonia' has' a' unicameral' parliament.' It' has' 12' constituencies' with' each' electing' 6' to' 13' seats.' The' voting' is' largely' proportional,' though' it' features' a' 5%' threshold' and' a' slightly' modified'd'Hondt'method,'making'it'somewhat'less'proportional.'No'party'holds'a'majority;' three' or' four' parties' generally' hold' 10' to' 30%' of' the' votes' each,' and' some' other' minor' parties' make' up' the' rest.' The' head' of' government' is' the' prime' minister;' the' president' mainly'has'a'symbolic'role.'Based'on'the'rather'proportional'voting'system'and'multifparty' existence,'the'Estonian'system'is'regarded'as'PR.' ' The'Slovak'Republic'uses'a'proportional'system'to'elect'all'members'of'the'National'Council,' the'unicameral'parliament'of'Slovakia.'The'whole'country'acts'as'one'constituency,'just'like' in' The' Netherlands' and' Israel.' There' is' a' 5%' threshold' for' all' parties.' Since' its' separation' from' the' Czech ' Republic' in' 1992,' five' national' elections' have' been' held,' and' no' party' has' held' a' majority.' 6' or' 7' parties' have' made' up' the' National' Council.' The' president' has' a' This' Chapter' will' review' the' results' from' the' ANOVA' analysis' performed' on' the' natural' growth' data' of' the' OECD' countries.' In' this' section,' a' 5%' significance' level' is' used.' The'
natural' growths' of' the' countries' are' grouped' into' either ' PR, ' majoritarian' or' mixed.' This' results' in' three' groups' with' respectively' 22, ' 7' and' 5' observations.' The' data' in' each' group' produces' an' average' natural' growth' for' that' group.' The' average' natural' growth' of' the' countries'with'a'majoritarian'system'was '0,031864,'or'3,18%; 'the'average'natural'growth'of' all'PR'systems'was'0,032289,'or'3,23%,'and'the'average'natural'growth'of'all'countries'with' a'mixed'system'was'0,032202,'or'3,22% .'A'plot'of'these'means'is'as'following:'
Group'1'is'majoritarian,'group'2'is'PR'and'group'3'is'mixed.'These'means'are'rather'close'to' each' other.' There' is' little' difference' between' the' PR ' and' mixed' group,' and' the' difference' between'PR'and'majoritarian'is'only'0,04'percentage'point.'' ' Section'4.2'' Checking'the'assumptions'
When'performing'an'ANOVA'analysis,'several'assumptions'are'made' (Field,'2009; 'Moore'et' al.,'2011) . 'First, 'it'is'assumed'that'the'samples'of'each'group'are'independent'of'each'other, ' ! 19! and' secondly' that' every' sample' is' selected' randomly' form' each' group.' These' are' mostly' theoretical'assumptions, 'and'there'is'no'apparent'reason'to'think'that'they'are'violated'in' this'research;'the'whole''population''of'countries'with'a'democracy'have'been'taken'in'into' account' in' this' thesis,' or' at' least' as' much' as' possible.' The' third' assumption' is' of' more' importance:'normal'distribution'in'each'group.'A'ShapirofWilk'test'has'been'performed'to' test'for'normality'in'each'of'the'three'groups.'The'output'is'as'following:' This'thesis'has'tried'to'establish'whether'the'electoral'system'of'a'country'actively' influences'economic'performance'of'that'country.'To'do'so,'three'different'electoral' systems'were'identified:'proportional'representation,'majoritarian'and'mixed.'To'measure' longfterm'economic'performance,'natural'economic'growth'was'calculated'using 'Lippi's' model'(1999) .'Subsequently,'an'ANOVA'analysis'has'been'performed'to'see'whether'the' natural'economic'growth'differed'among'electoral'systems.'As'the'ANOVA'test'revealed'no' significant'difference'between'the'groups,'this'was'not'the'case.'
As'established'in'Chapter'4,'this'thesis'has'not'been'able'to'find'a'significant'influence'of'the' electoral'system'on'the'economic'performance'of'countries.'In'fact,'when'looking'at'the' natural'growth'of'countries,'the'average'natural'growth'was'quite'similar'in'the'three' different'groups.'The'difference'in'economic'performance'between'electoral'systems,'
suggested'by'the'theoretical'research'mentioned'in'Chapter'1,'was'not'observable'in'this' data.'The'effect'of'an'electoral'system'is'either'negligible'or'nonfexistent,'at'least'in'the'data' used'in'this'thesis.'' ' Section'5.2'' Limitations'and'recommendations'
The'natural'growth,'which'was'calculated'for'all'OECD'countries,'was,'at'best,'based'on'the' nominal'and'real'GDP'growth'of'34'years.'Ideally,'more'data'would'be'used'to'establish'the' model'discussed'in'section'2.2.'In'some'cases,'like'Germany'and'Slovakia,'data'was'only' available'for'about'10'years.'That'is'very'little'to'base'a'regression'on.'One'could'try'and' calculate'the'economic'growth'for'Germany'before'1990'by'using'GDP'data'on'West'and' East'Germany,'but'the'political'system'of'these'countries'were'very'different'than'after'the' unification'-'posing'problems'when'grouping'Germany.'The'same'holds'for'Slovakia.'Not'
only'was'the'Slovakian'model'based'on'little'data,'but'the'model'also'produced'rather' insignificant'variables.'This'means'that'the'estimation'for'the'natural'growth'of'Slovakia'may' not'be'precise.'As'there'are'only'34'observations'of'natural'growth,'it'is'regrettable'that'the' To'better'investigate'the'relationship'between'electoral'systems'and'natural'growth,'one' could'build'a'model'using'more'factors,'for'example'continent'or'type'of'economic'activity' (agricultural,'industrial'or'service).'This'would'also'capture'interactional'effects.' ' Apart'from'the'regressions'used'to'estimate'natural'growth,'there'are'some'limitations'to' the'ANOVA'analysis'performed'in'Chapter'4.'The'amount'of'data'points'in'each'group'was' rather'out'of'balance;'there'were'22'countries'in'the'PR'group,'7'in'the'majoritarian'group' and'5'in'the'mixed'group.'This'is'largely'due'to'the'fact'that'most'European'countries'have' some'form'of'a'PR'system,'while'few'countries'have'implemented'a'majoritarian'system.'
This'is'a'difficult'problem'to'solve,'as'one'cannot'just'take'out'some'PR'countries'or'add' some'more'majoritarian'countries.'Perhaps'in'time,'when'more'countries'converge'to'a' democratic'government,'this'research'could'be'repeated'with'more'countries.''
